is a case where many religious citizens want not only to embody their own ethical practices but also to make claims in, and on, the common public sphere.
defense of the right to blaspheme thus amounts to a demand that all religions be transformed into privatized and internalized states of belief along the lines of Protestant Christianity. While there have been other reasons for objecting to such expressions as Serrano's "Piss Christ," Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, Kurt Westergaard's cartoon of Muhammad with a bomb in his turban and Lars Vilk's cartoon of Muhammad as a dog, 8 this particular attempt to trouble and unsettle standing liberal secular understandings of the relationship between speech and religiosity is particularly prominent across academic disciplines.
Importantly, the account advanced in the writings of Asad, Mahmood and others does not rest on the claim that religious attachments are superior to non-religious attachments, or that the symbols and exemplars to which the religious attach themselves are inherently unworthy of being maligned. There is no independent argument advanced to show why others should be bound by the ethical sensibilities of the religious, only an account of how speech impacts the religious morally and emotionally. At stake is not a defense of the sacred, but rather an account of the subjective emotional worlds of certain persons. Already, we have reason to doubt that we are dealing with a radical critique of the secular even on the part of those purporting to make the secular the object of critique.
Nonetheless, are these critiques at least right in their diagnosis of secular discourse about religious injury? If they are, what follows for an ethics or a politics of speech in multicultural conditions? I will argue that the critique itself misrepresents Islamic religious discourse about injury from speech, simplifies secular discourse about religion and religious injury, and misunderstands the relationship between the defense of free speech and the understanding of the injuries which speech can cause.
Translation Failure? Habitus, Lived Relationships and Injurious Speech
This popular critique of the liberal treatment of speech and religious injury begins with a diagnosis of how liberal secularism understands religion and thus how it understands the nature of religious injury. For Saba Mahmood, "while some liberals could see the lurking racism behind the [Danish] cartoons, the religious dimension of the Muslim protest remained troubling. Thus even when there was recognition that Muslim religious sensibilities were not properly accommodated in Europe, there was nonetheless an inability to understand the sense of injury expressed by so many Muslims." 9 Why this inability? On this account, the inability is caused by a fundamental mistake about how many pious religious subjects relate to signs, religious claims and ethical life. According to Mahmood and others, liberal secularism explicitly assumes that the religious objection is to speech that it regards as "blasphemous." "It is this consensus across opposed camps that I want to unsettle, calling our attention to normative conceptions enfolded within this assessment about what constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity in the modern world."
10 On Mahmood's interpretation, diagnosing the conflict over speech as one between an objection to blasphemy and a commitment to free speech involves ascribing to the pious religious subject a belief-centered, propositional relationship to religion. The concept of blasphemy "presuppose[s] a semiotic ideology in which signifiers are arbitrarily linked to concepts, their meaning open to people's reading in accord with a particular code they share between them."
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Much is often made of the purported bias in the so-called "Protestant" conception of religion-as-beliefs underlying secular jurisprudence and ethical theory on freedom of religion and toleration. 12 This charge was central to the "communitarian" critique of Rawlsian liberalism: "Assimilating religious liberty to a general right to choose one's own values misdescribes the nature of religious conviction. Construing all religious convictions as products of choice may miss the role that religion plays in the lives of those for whom the observance of religious duties is a constitutive end, essential to their good and indispensible to their identity." 13 It remains widespread throughout scholarship on liberalism and religion in anthropology, political theory and legal studies. It provides, for example, for Mahmood's central critical move:
What I want to problematize here is the presumption that religion is ultimately a matter of choice; such a judgment is predicated on a prior notion that religion is ultimately about belief in a set of propositions to which one gives one's assent. Once this premise is granted then it is easy to assert that one can change one's beliefs just as easily as one might change one's dietary preferences or one's name. While the problematic conception of race as a biological attribute might be apparent to the reader, the normative conception of religion offered here encounters few challenges. … The legal critics I cite here do not simply misrecognize the kind of religiosity at stake in Muslim reactions to the Danish cartoons but also echo the presumptions of the civil law tradition in which the epistemological status of religious belief has come to be cast as speculative and therefore as less real than the materiality of race and biology. In opposition to this conception, it is argued that religion is often not experienced so much as a discrete set of propositions which one accepts or rejects, but as something inherited or naturalized through habitus and which is manifested in bodily practices, lived social relationships and public institutions. The argument is that we should not see religion as something that an autonomous self chooses, but rather see the subject as something emerging out of religious discipline. On this view, Muslim piety should not be understood in terms of a communicative or representative relationship to the Prophet Muhammad but rather according to a model whereby "Muhammad is regarded as a moral exemplar whose words and deeds are understood not so much as commandments but as ways of inhabiting the world, bodily and ethically." 21 For Mahmood the sense of moral injury that emanates from such a relationship between the ethical subject and the figure of exemplarity is quite distinct from the one that the notion of blasphemy encodes. The notion of moral injury I am describing no doubt entails a sense of violation, but this violation emanates not from the judgment that the [religious] law has been transgressed but that one's being, grounded as it is in a relationship of dependency with the Prophet, has been shaken. For many Muslims, the offense the cartoons committed was not against a moral interdiction but against a structure of affect, a habitus, that feels wounded. This wound requires moral action, but the language of this wound is neither juridical nor that of street protest because it does not belong to an economy of blame, accountability, and reparations. The action that it requires is internal to the structure of affect, relations, and virtues that predispose one to experience an act as a violation in the first place. 22 While there are some important differences between their accounts, Talal Asad also advances an interpretation of the objection to scandalous speech within Islam that emphasizes the Muslim commitment to preserving a "lived relationship," rather than truth in doctrinal belief, a relationship that public speech can disrupt. According to Asad, the concern that justifies the traditional shari'a punishments for blasphemy, heresy or apostasy is "not the correctness or otherwise of 'belief' in this sense [of theological doctrine], but the legal and social consequences of a Muslim teaching a doctrine that was said to be contrary to Islamic commitment. … Put another way, insofar as the [sacred] law concerns itself with disbelief, it is not a matter of a propositional untruth but of a solemn social relationship being openly repudiated." 23 that, in the end, it might be only by belief that man is saved, 27 or (like with Calvin) that belief is a mark of God's designation for salvation. 28 It cannot explain the Islamic legal doctrine that merely committing a grave sin does not make one an apostate, but believing the sin to be licit does. 29 Finally, it cannot begin to do justice to the modern Salafi pietistic movement that, for all of its concern with embodied practice and ethical behavior, is foremost a movement about purifying creed and belief. To put it bluntly, the jurists and theologians are concerned about every possible form of harm that might arise from illicit speech. They are concerned about the circulation of false doctrines, about violation of the honor of the Prophet Muhammad (hence why mockery in particular resonates so deeply), about diminution of the esteem in which religion is held, about the violations of rules set out in revelation, about rebellion against God and about rebellion against the social order. 32 The greatest treatise in the Mahmood are telling about why speech does the harm that it does is the fullest and most convincing one for those interested in Islam as a discursive tradition, for present purposes I mean to raise questions about what is meant by "belief" in popular and academic discourse about religion. While holding up "belief" as the defining feature of "Protestant"
understandings of religion, they remain disturbingly uncurious about the various possible meanings of referring to "belief." 34 When one refers to religion as involving belief, this
should not be understood tendentiously as only a reference to "privatizable" belief about theological matters that neither break my leg nor pick my pocket (the nature of Christ, who exactly was God's final Prophet), but also normative beliefs about action in the common social world. The proposition "insults to the Prophet Muhammad are wrong and must be opposed in some way" is a belief-statement, as are the range of arguments that explain and justify it. It seems odd to deny that this is a moral belief that is held by large numbers of Muslims for various religious reasons, and not only because they inhabit an assimilative relationship of cohabitation with Muhammad.
Third, does the anthropological account of embodiment and injury displace a focus on belief? The claim that lived traditions need to be studied in a different way from written discourse is convincing. However, the focus on habitus or embodied practices does not oppose a focus on religious beliefs but merely picks up the story at a different point. The question is why Muslims seek to emulate the Prophet Muhammad, to assimilate their behavior into his, to cohabitate with him. Or why they seek to protect certain doctrines and oppose other ones in order to preserve a particular way of life.
Again, it seems to me that we are being asked to accept an oppositional binary that simply doesn't exist between (a) believing in the truth of a proposition and (b) cultivating certain dispositions and preserving lived relationships.
I doubt that any pious Muslim would be the slightest bit reluctant to declare,
propositionally, that one embodies certain practices and inhabits a relationship of assimilation with the Prophet because Muhammad is God's Messenger, the Seal of the Prophets, who received an absolutely true revelation from God. 35 Or to declare that emulating him is not only a "way of inhabiting the world, bodily and ethically," but of being obedient to God and, God willing, being saved on the Day of Judgment. Naturally, it is incomplete to assert that pious Muslims are wounded by expressive assaults on the Prophet because they believe that the shari'a has forbidden this, even for non-Muslims. 42 two points bear mentioning: those cases do not represent the historical center of gravity in free exercise jurisprudence which has tended to protect practice unless there is a compelling state interest that justifies restricting it; and, more importantly here, the judgment that the secular constitution should only protect belief absolutely does not imply the judgment that "religion" only consists in belief. Rather, it is that belief is the one aspect of religion that the secular law may never restrict, even though the religious will inevitably want more than this for internal religious reasons.
Nor are neo-Kantian liberal philosophers, the most likely suspects for reducing religion to autonomously held belief, under some universal misapprehension about religion. Ronald Dworkin, for example, does not defend the right to offend on the grounds that people voluntarily choose their beliefs and that convictions are separate from one's personal identity or sense of self: "It is often said that religion is special, because people's religious convictions are so central to their personalities that they should not be asked to tolerate ridicule." 43 While he preserves the language of "conviction" and "belief" (which most Muslims would not object to), his defense of free speech openly acknowledges the contrary account of religious selfhood and is thus not based on a mistake about what ridicule can do to the religious. Similarly, it seems hasty to suggest that the secular liberal tradition is stuck in a position about speech that assumes the religious object to blasphemy on the grounds that their ideas or beliefs should remain untouched. One of the most prolific liberal writers on blasphemy and religion, Peter Jones, noted in 1980 during the Gay News case in England that "much the most plausible defence of a blasphemy law is that it is necessary to protect religious believers from suffering offence to their feelings," 44 a characterization which overlaps with legal theorist Joel Feinberg's understanding of blasphemy as "expressions of disrespect toward something treasured by the listener as deserving of the highest respect." 45 These are just three easily-accessed quotes, and I do not mean to deny that anyone treats religion simplistically in terms of freely chosen belief, nor that many dimensions of religious practice and injury are ill-grasped by secular discourse (as is true vice-versa).
But it does seem wildly implausible that the present divide between the secular public sphere and Muslims injured and enraged by speech about Muhammad is attributable to so basic and elementary a mistake as a supposed uniformly held Western understanding that religion is only a matter of freely chosen belief and that speech about religion is only speech about those beliefs, whereas Muslims inhabit some other mode of relating to the sacred. The idea that the secular West assumes blasphemy to be an attack on beliefs at the very least needs to address the ordinary language sense of blasphemy as defilement, desecration, irreverence, profanation, sacrilege or simply "verbal offense against the sacred." 46 Nor is it very convincing that the kind of injury described by Asad 49 It is precisely the transformation of assaults on the sacred into assaults on religious affect that the secular mind can most easily accommodate and it was thus not at all uncommon for various officials to issue apologies for offense to "people's religious feelings" (not beliefs) during the Danish cartoon affair. 50 While the American public sphere may be more favorable toward religion in broad cultural terms, the concern for religious affect remains more reflected in the law in Europe than in the United States. Although European national and EU human rights jurisprudence does seem to be moving in the direction of greater protection for merely religiously offensive speech (as opposed to incitement to hatred on religious grounds), 51 it is moving that way from a place of concern about injury to religious affect, not offense 
Injurious Speech: Which Gap between Religion and the Religious Subject Matters?
Carrying to its extreme limits the view that religion is not about freely chosen belief but about constituting the self raises very challenging questions about the ability of free speech advocates to distinguish between acceptable (if painful) speech about religion from unacceptable (if legal) hate speech on grounds of race, sex or sexuality. After all, the central claim of the critical position under review here is that the distinction between racial or sexual identities that are unchosen and thus partially define who we are, and religious, cultural or ideological beliefs which we have, is faulty.
We are not presently concerned about the claim that much speech about Muhammad or Islam is de facto racist hate speech about Muslims because it is coded speech using religion as an alibi. We are concerned, rather, about the idea that just as the liberal defender of free speech has no coherent way of distinguishing between speech and action (since to speak is to do something), she has no coherent way of distinguishing between her moral acceptance of blasphemy and her condemnation of racist, sexist and homophobic hate speech without resorting to a discredited idea of religion as involving freely chosen belief. The claim is thus that the liberal defender of the right to outrage the religious refuses to problematize her presumption that religion is ultimately a matter of the free choice to assent to a set of propositions which one can then replace just as easily as one might change one's dietary preferences or style of dress.
The very plausible idea that the religious do not see their selves as separate from their commitments and attachments does not seem to expose a serious problem internal to the liberal defense of free speech for three main reasons: (1) the opposition to hate speech is not primarily based on the way in which the attributes which are the target of hate speech have been acquired; (2) while it is true that religion is very rarely a matter of freely chosen belief, neither is it plausibly reduced to an immutable, identity-giving attribute; and (3) First, then, I would submit that the stakes of the "free choice" question about religious beliefs are easily exaggerated. While some may defend the right to attack religion, unlike race or gender, on the grounds that a person may change her religion and thus need not be offended by such speech, this is clearly not the core issue in opposing racist or sexist speech or in a more favorable attitude toward anti-religious speech. The opposition to racist, sexist and homophobic speech does not rest entirely, or even primarily, on the fact that such speech targets aspects of persons that they cannot change.
Rather, the point is that these are attributes or identities for which people should not be made to suffer disadvantage and yet for which have often been made to suffer terrible disadvantages. For example, there are certainly very many homophobic practices that we regard as particularly cruel because sexual preference is not thought to be a freely cultivated taste. But to argue for protection for homosexuality merely on the basis that it is innate and unchangeable is consistent with regarding it as an unfortunate evil deserving only of tolerance, and leaves vulnerable those whose sexuality is more fluid than an innate gay/straight binary allows.
Similarly, a critique of the secular treatment of religious injury cannot rest on the fact that religious beliefs, attitudes and practices are unchosen by the individual: vile beliefs, attitudes and attachments which few would want to protect are just as much a matter of acquisition through habitus and socialization as admirable ones. Nonetheless, we oppose attitudes and practices that we deplore not because they are voluntarily chosen or easy to change on the part of individuals, but because we think that their occurrence in society might be reduced through such opposition. No one, least of all adherents of proselytizing religions like Christianity and Islam, can deny that religion is mutable in this sense.
At the same time, however, just as the fact that the innateness or immutability of an attribute does not suffice to explain why persons should not be made to suffer for that attribute, so does the mutability of a personal or group identity not exclude that identity from certain protection. An appropriate comparison here is language. A particular language is not a biological attribute. It is far from impossible, although for adults not easy, to abandon one language and adopt another. Yet, language (much like religion) is usually associated intimately with ethnicity, nationality, culture, group identity, history, place and memory. Not only do we see why groups might demand extensive language rights, 53 we can also easily see why they would be injured personally by insults to their language -mockery of tone or accent, denigration of a language's vocabulary or richness, diminution of its age or derivation, or dismissal of its literary heritage. (Saul Bellow's infamous remark about the Zulus' lack of a Tolstoy was regarded, rightly, as a diminution of the cultural value of the Zulu people.)
So if religion is never merely belief, identity or way of life alone, and religiously injurious speech is thus neither speech-about-persons nor speech-about-ideas simpliciter, is the right response then to not speak about religiously injurious speech in general but to make distinctions between expressions on the basis of content, context, form and the presumed intent of the agent? Surely this is unavoidable, just as we make distinctions between merely offensive or ignorant remarks and the kinds of racist, sexist and homophobic utterances that we are inclined to identify as hate speech. But in discussing racism, sexism and homophobia (as well attacks on other politicized identities, like ethno-linguistic community), we begin with the assumption that these are directed at attributes which ought not to be the object of attack in the first place and thus end with
the conclusion that what matters in the case of such expression is primarily its effect.
But this is precisely what we cannot assume about religiously offensive and injurious speech. This is not, to repeat, because religion is merely a matter of belief, and freely chosen belief at that, so religiously injurious speech can only be a form of selfimposed injury or a category mistake. Nor is it because religion is a social identity for How could it be otherwise in a society that contains not only more than one religion but more than one attitude towards religion in general? Ironically, the claim that respect for religion requires respecting "non-Protestant" religions as well by protecting them from injurious speech is nothing other than a demand that other citizens treat their own beliefs in "Protestant" terms -that is, as beliefs that must only be privately assented to and not manifested in public through conduct and speech. It seems, moreover, that popular and academic concern about religious injury does not primarily rest on a radical doubt about the terms of secular discourse. Few are willing to say that anywhere the pious feel injured when others pursue their aims in the world there we see secular political theory incapable of appreciating its own cryptotheological categories, misrecognizing the nature of religion, and deafening itself to other forms of moral knowledge. Instead, sympathy for the religious in the case of injurious speech seems to derive from two features of such speech in its present context: that today the religious target of provocative speech is not usually (at least in the West) a powerful, clerical hegemony but rather vulnerable minority communities, and that it seems intuitively plausible that religious symbols attach in some way to the religious, and thus their objection to injurious speech is not merely an arbitrary intrusion into the freedom of others. Speech about Jesus is speech done unto Christians in a way that sinful sex is not.
However, because few (secular) critics of secular thought are actually willing to endorse a religious claim to sovereignty over the linguistic and artistic use of religious symbols, it seems that they thus basically remain part of the liberal project of constantly searching for ways to improve social coexistence between the secular and the religious. This is obviously not the end of the matter. It is true that experiences of emotional harm and moral injury are the inevitable consequences of social life. Moreover, we ought to be wary of the fantasy that we can be free from the uncertainty and risk necessarily involved in living together with other humans. Such a fantasy reflects a desire for a certain kind of sovereignty over one's fellows and over one's environment that can never be achieved. At the same time, however, we know that our social world is not the product of natural phenomena but of human institutions; it can and must be improved. Thus, while wary of the temptation towards total control over our social world, we are also aware that not all suffering -including emotional pain -has to be tolerated.
With this dilemma in mind, it appears that if we are looking to regulate or discourage speech we are better off beginning with speech that clearly and intentionally targets persons and groups in an effort to impose unnecessary and unreasonable social and political burdens on them for the sake of others' enjoyment or advantage, and not speech that merely disrupts the religious relationship with the sacred. Secular politics will always struggle with the fact that this appears to some religious persons as arbitrary, if speech is regulated to protect against some harms but not others. But given the nature of pluralism in a post-traditional world and the great goods (as well as harms) that depend on speech, it seems too much to ask of secular political theory that it concern itself with anything but the tangible social harms caused by speech.
At the same time, we should not imagine that speech ostensibly and formally about the sacred can never harm the political and moral project of securing the place of all citizens within a fair and inclusive society. The argument of this article is that not all speech about Muhammad is de facto speech against Muslims, not that speech about
Muhammad is never coded speech about Muslims. We might speak then of an obligation on the part of powerful majorities not only to treat minorities fairly but to reinforce the minority's sense of security in this treatment. To paraphrase: "Multicultural inclusion must not only be done, but must be seen to be done."
This standard may overlap at times with a standard that would encourage selfrestraint in speaking about the sacred per se, but the two are not the same. Some will judge at times that sacrilege is a reasonable cost to impose on others for genuinely important self-expression or social commentary. I would further suggest that whether or not religiously offensive speech threatens the political project of inclusion is not a property of such speech outside of its social context, 57 but is precisely a judgment to be pursued through a wide and inclusive form of public reason, discourse ethics or political persuasion. 58 Even if we continue to disagree on whether specific expressions constitute a significant harm to a group's sense of belonging, membership and security in a wider community, securing this standard as the terrain of reasoning and argumentation would be no small achievement.
